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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -

19.581

1957

The older cases held Doe personally liable and refused to admit parol
evidence of the intent not to hold him. Most of the recent decisions

construe the signature as ambiguous, admit paroi evidence and presume
that the agent is not personally liable.9
The instant case involves a signature "in between" the two cases listed
above, and represents a case of first impression in Ohio. The negotiable
note read:
"We promise to pay...
The X Company

John Doe, Vice President

Richard Roe"

The court held that parol evidence would be admissible to show that
Roe was in fact the president of the corporation and that the parties
intended that he would not be liable. The court added that since Roe
could have easily signed in a representative capacity, the burden is on
him to show by dear and convincing evidence that he was not intended
to be a party. Since there was no evidence as to whether the payee of
the note understood the effect of Roe's signature, the court held that Roe
had failed to sustain the burden and was personally liable as a co-maker.' 0
HUGH ALAN Ross

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Pleading "Negligence" and "Carelessness"
It has not been the practice of the author of this -portion of the survey to report decisions of courts of common pleas, since rthey are, no
matter 'how well-reasoned and logical, not usually final. But, by the
same token, decisions on purely pleading matters are seldom found at a
higher level. It therefore seems desirable to report a late decision of
Judge McBride, of the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County,
on a pleading issue of considerable importance.
Judge McBride, in Mays v. Morgan,' sustained the motion of defendant to strike from the plaintiff's petition the words, "negligently and
carelessly," wherever they appeared in the following paragraph thereof:
Plaintiff further says that at the time of plaintiff's injury..
the defendant was negligent and careless of the safety of the plaintiff and others
lawfully passing upon and along said dedicated public alley way, in that she
"See cases cited in MECEM, OUTLnqES OF AGENcY §§ 314-17 (4th ed. 1952);
and Cannon v. Miller Rubber Co., 128 Ohio St. 72, 190 N.E. 210 (1934).
" Johnstone Machinery Co. v. Owens Screw Products, 145 N.E. 2d 559 (Ohio Munic.

Ct. 1957).
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did negligently and carelessly maintain said garage in a rotten and decayed
and unsafe condition; that defendant negligently and carelessly failed and
omitted to replace said rotten and decayed garage with sound material of
sufficient strength to support said garage, but did negligently and carelessly
permit said rotten and decayed garage to remain in an unsafe condition in
close proximity to said public thoroughfare, as aforesaid, all of which facts
defendant well knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable or proper diligence,
2
should have known but which were not known to the plaintiff.

The decision appears dearly right to this writer. If what was done
by defendant was negligent under all the circumstances, the trial court
will so inform the jury. If it was not, nothing (except prejudicial epithets) has been added to the pleading by the -use of the dirty -words.
They are mere conclusions of law, regardless of the way they are viewed.
The case is in line with a slow reform which has been taking place
in Ohio pleading fostered by a few courageous and clear-thinkiing judges,
at both the trial and higher appellate levels.3
Service by Publication - Strict Compliance
With Statute Required
The careful attention which counsel must devote .to detail in obtaining jurisdiction quasi-in-ren over Absent defendants in such proceedings
as attachments is indicated in Corbet v. Fowble.4 Plaintiff filed suit
against a non-resident defendant, the residence address of said defendant
being known at all times to plaintiff. He attached certain real estate
belonging to defendant and filed a proper affidavit for constructive service. He failed, however, for three -weeks after commencement of action
and the first publication, to instruct the clerk to mail a copy of the
publication to the defendant, despite the wording of the statute pertaining thereto5 which requires the party making service to deliver copies
of the published notice immediately after the first publication. The
court, relying correctly, I think, on the second and third syllabi of Lincoln
Tavern, Inc. v. Swttder6 held that the mailing of the copy 20 days after
first publication did not meet the intendment of the statute and dissolved the attachment.
'145 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio C.P. 1957).

2Ibid.

'See Dansby v. Dansby, 165 Ohio St. 112, 133 N.E.2d 358 (1956); commented
on, 1956 Survey, 8 WEST. RES. L. REV. 261 (1957). See also Brown v. Pollard,
112 N.E.2d 692 (1953) and other cases cited in Judge McBride's opinion.
' 145 N.E.2d 466 (1956).
r OHio REv. CODE 5 2703.16.
* 165 Ohio St. 61, 133 N.E.2d 606; 1956 Survey, 8 WEST. RES. L. REv. 263
(1957).
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Service of Process on Non-Resident Operators
of Motor Vehicles
Since the landmark case of Hess v. Pawloski,7 the constitutionality of
service of process -upon and exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident motorists has been recognized. It is probably safe to say that
every state now has legislation permitting such service.8
Once established the idea grew and the concept of amenability to
personal jurisdiction has now been extended far beyond the original
concept of service upon a person whose driving activities upon the state's
highways gave -rise to a cause of action. For example, in -the recent case
of Paduchik v. Mikoff,9 the Supreme Court allowed the application of
the statute to a situation in which -the injury occurred on private property. There remained the situation -in which a non-moving vehicle would
be the injury-producing instrumentality. This occurred in Taylor v.
Hall,10 in which plaintiff was injured as a result of the unexpected opening of -the cab door of a visiting truck, across a sidewalk on which
plaintiff was walking. The court -built upon the logic of previously decided cases, in Ohio, and elsewhere and pointed out that the Ohio statute
is -not restricted to accidents or collisions occurring while operating a
motor vehicle on a public highway, and denied defendant's motion to
quash service of summons upon him.

Transfer of Interest in Action
The Revised Code provides"- for the transfer of a party's interest in
an action pending the litigation thereof. It has long been established
that the assignment by a plaintiff of his interest in a controversy during
-pendency of a suit thereon is not a defense to the action, but that the
cause may proceed in his name.12
The Court of Appeals for Summit County held' 8 in the period covered by this survey, that the same principles and statute apply when only
a part of the interest is transferred by plaintiff. Plaintiff was the beneficiary of a negative covenant. Plaintiff sold that part of its business
'to which the covenant related. The court held 'that-the act-ion might
7274

U.S. 352 (1927).

aOHio Rnv. CODE §§2703.20-.22.
'158 Ohio St. 533, 110 N.E.2d 562 (1953).
10103 Ohio App. 283, 145 N.E.2d 241 (1956).
O IO REV. CODE § 2307.25: ".... on any other transfer of interest, the action may
be continued in the name of the original party, or the court may allow the person to
whom the transfer is made to be substituted for him."
" Cullen &Vaughn Co. v. Bender Co., 122 Ohio St. 82, 179 N.E. 633 (1930).
' Akron Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Cox, 101 Ohio App. 347, 140 N.E.2d 7 (1956).
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continue in the name of the original plaintiff for -the benefit of the
assignee or transferee, or that the person to whom the transfer was made
might be substituted for him.
Habeas Corpus Not Available To Test Revocation
of Convict's Parole
Habeas corpus is an ancient common law writ of an extraordinary
civil nature, used primarily to secure the liberty of a person who is being restrained of -his liberty by a person or under an order of a judicial
officer without jurisdiction to do so. It does not -lie to test mere errors
or irregularities in trial which do not oust the trial court of -its jurisdiction.' 4 It -will not lie as a mere substitute for appeal or a motion for
new trial.
The difficult problem arises with respect to the convict on parole. 15
He -is not restrained of his liberty in the strict sense and it is usually
held that the writ is not available to him. In In Re Varner,16 the parole
problem was compounded by the additional fact that the Pardon and
Parole Commission had revoked petitioner's parole and ordered his return to the Ohio State Reformatory. He sought habeas corpus on the
ground that the determination of the commission that 'he had violated the
conditions of his parole was "arbitrary, fraudulent, false, capricious and
an abuse of discretion, . . . beyond -its statutory powers and an unlawful
denial of [-his] legal and constitutional -rights...."17
The Supreme Court held that such action of the commission is not
,reviewable in a habeas corpus proceeding, even though the convict is
returned .to confinement because of such action. The authorities outside
of Ohio are in conflict on this question. The Court held that only by
"a strained construction of some of the language of our statutes"' 8 could
there be found a legislative intent that there is to be a hearing before a
-prisoner on parole is declared to be a parole violator and that since a
prisoner confined in the penitentiary has no right -to parole,"9 'he has no
right -to contest a revocation of parole 'by the commission's determination
"For a good r~sum6 of the subject, see Kramer v. Alvis, 103 Ohio App. 324, 141
N.E.2d 489 (1956); PERKiNs, CASES AND MATmuALS ON CmuaNAL PROCEDURE
pp. 738-45 (2d ed. 1952).
'C Cf. PEmKiNS, note 14, supra.
" 166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N.E.2d 846 (1957).
' Id. at 341.
""OHIO REv. CODE § 2965.01-.34.
"Ex Parte Tischler, 127 Ohio St. 404, 188 N.E. 730 (1933).
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that he is a parole violator without a clear statutory expression of an
intent to confer such right upon him.
When Is An Action "Pending"?
The question of when an action is pending may become an important
one in the course of -procedure. For example, one ground of demurrer
to a petition is that it shows on its face that there is another action pending between the same parties on the same subject matter.2 ' The courts
of Ohio appear never to have defined the term dearly. An early case2
has said that a common-law action cannot be said to be pending before
mesne process is issued.
In Doty v. West,28 the Court of Appeals for Franklin County had
occasion to consider the problem. Boyd sued Doty in the Common Pleas
Court of Montgomery County to recover a real estate broker's commission. Residence service was purported to have been made and a default
judgment was entered. Subsequently, defendant moved to quash service
of summons. After hearing, -the motion was granted and the default
judgment was set aside. No further action was taken for almost three
years, but the action remained pending at the petition level.
Meanwhile, plaintiff filed a similar action against defendant in Franklin County Common Pleas. Defendant answered, claiming, among other
defenses, that an action was pending between him ard plaintiff involving .the same cause of action.
Relying on the -provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.17,24
the appeals court held that since there had been no praecipe for service
filed the action in Montgomery County had not been commenced and
was therefore not pending. The result appears to be fully in accord
with the statutes and logic.28
' 2The reader is also invited to examine State of Ohio, ex rel. Chapman v. Lowery,

Ohio Pardon and Parole Commission, 140 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) in
which the Court granted a petition in mandamus to compel the Commission to perform its statutory duties of making, adopting, and publishing the necessary rules for
its organization and procedure, as required by Omo REV. CODE § 2965.05, holding

also that no prior demand is necessary for performance of a public duty.
2'OHIo REV. CODE 5 2309.08 (D).
mBowry v. OdeU, 4 Ohio St.623, 627 (1855).

144 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
""An action is commenced . . . , as to each defendant, at the date of the summons
which is served on him or on a co-defendant who is a joint contractor or otherwise
united in interest with him ......
Gehelo v. Gehelo, 160 Ohio St. 243, 116 N.E.2d 7 (1953).
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Jurisdiction of Courts - Service by Publication to
Impose Constructive Trust on Shares of
Domestic Corporation
In the 1954 Survey, we discussed the question of the jurisdiction of
an Ohio court to adjudicate with respect to shares of stock, not themselves 'before the court.26 In the case of Silberman v. Silberman,2 the
Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals had held that an Ohio court could
impose a constructive trust upon shares of stock in an Ohio corporation
by personal service upon .the corporation and some individual defendants
and by service by publication upon certain non-residents. The court held
that the stock was actually personal property in Ohio, the habitation or
domicile of the company, which is the creature of the state which created
it, and that the certificates of stock in the hands of absent defendants
were only evidence of the ownership of the shares.
The case of Brownewell v. Columbus Clay Mfg. Co. 28 came before the
Supreme Court on certification from the Court of Appeals of Franklin
County as a result of a conflict between the decision of the latter court
and that of the Cuyahoga Appeals Court in Silberman v. Silberman.29
Relying on provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Actao the Supreme
Court held that the effect of that act is to embody the shares in the certificate. When the act is -in force in the state of incorporation, the situs
of the shares is that of the physical location of the certificate, even
though such location is -in a foreign state.
While the case could have been decided on the ground that since the
shares of stock at the time of suit were in an estate being administered
by a California probate court, and therefore the rule of prior -invocation
of jurisdiction applicable, the effect of the case is undoubtedly to overrule
Silberman and establish the rule of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act in
Ohio.
Going Behind Judgment To Show Non-Dischargeable
Character of Claim
Plaintiff had recovered a judgment in an Ohio common pleas court
on a cognovit note. The note had 'been executed and delivered by defendant to plaintiff in part -payment of money embezzled by defendant
from plaintiff while -in plaintiff's employ. No evidence was -placed in
P Commented on, 1954 Survey, 6 WEST. RIs. L. REV, 223, 236 (1955).
' 99 Ohio App. 340, 121 N.E.2d 838 (1954).
" 166 Ohio St. 324, 142, N.E.2d 511 (1957).
"99 Ohio App. 340, 121 N.E.2d 838 (1954).
• OHIO REv. CODE §§ 1705.01-.21.
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the record at -the -time of the rendition of the judgment on the note as to
the nature of and non-dischargeability of the obligation 'upon which it
was based.
Subsequently defendant was adjudged a bankrupt, one of his scheduled debts being the plaintiff's judgment claim. Plaintiff was duly notified of the 'bankruptcy proceedings, in which defendant was discharged
from all his debts, including plaintiff's judgment claim. It does -not
appear whether -plaintiff objected thereto.
Still later -plaintiff sought an order in the state court proceeding in
aid of execution and the question was presented whether -the court in
which such proceedings -were-instituted ought to permit -the introduction
of evidence to show the nature of the original indebtedness. The lower
courts refused to permit a showing of the nature of the debt and the
Supreme Court affirmed.3 ' Citing the text of legal encyclopedias, the
court held that although it is permitted to go behind -the judgment for
the purpose of ascertaining the character of .the original obligation, the
scope of the showing in this respect is limited to the record of the judgment or of the proceedings in which it was obtained. If nothing appears
on that record showing the original obligation to have been of a character excepted from the operation of the discharge in bankruptcy the
judgment will 'be discharged, and if that 'record discloses the non-dischargeable character of the original obligation, -the judgment will not be
discharged.
The lesson is obvious to the practicing lawyer. In reducing a nondischargeable obligation to judgment, he must be very careful in order
to protect his client to have the judgment record indicate clearly the
nature of the obligation which is thus made a matter of a -record debt.
For a somewhat similar case the reader is invited to consider Carroll v.
Jones3 2 which involved the discharge of a judgment obtained by default.
The allegations of the plaintiff's petition that the acts of defendant were
willful and malicious misconduct were held -to -be mere statements of
conclusions of law.
Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts To Vacate
Judgment During Term
A court of general jurisdiction, such as common pleas, 'has control
of its own orders and judgments during the term of court at which they
are rendered, which control may be exercised, within the sphere of sound
discretion, as an inherent right founded upon common law; nor is 'this
'Jacobs v. Beatty, 165 Ohio St. 596, 138 N.E.2d 657 (1956).
m 141 N.E.2d 239 (Ohio C.P. 1956).

